The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2: Restructuring by Dani Rodrik
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2, The
Volume Author/Editor: Olivier Blanchard, Kenneth Froot, Jeffrey Sachs,
eds.
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-05662-7
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/blan94-3
Conference Date: February 26-29, 1992
Publication Date: January 1994
Chapter Title: Foreign Trade in Eastern Europe's Transition: Early Results
Chapter Author: Dani Rodrik
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6730




Integration  into the world economy is one of the difficult tasks awaiting East 
European countries in transition. Three of these countries-Hungary,  Poland, 
and (former) Czechoslovakia-have  already traveled far along this road. Their 
economies have opened up dramatically, and trade with the West has expanded 
rapidly, while trade with the East has collapsed under the joint influence of the 
demise of the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) and the loss 
of  Soviet markets. This paper discusses and analyzes the early results on the 
trade front in these three countries. 
As we shall see, such an analysis is plagued by  many uncertainties. Basic 
trade data are in some cases unreliable, and many other statistics are plagued 
by the inability of official statisticians to keep track of  institutional changes 
and the expansion of the private sector. With many reforms taking place simul- 
taneously and many shocks to contend with, it is difficult to discern changes 
that can be attributed to the trade reforms  alone. Hence, few solid conclu- 
sions emerge. 
The paper  starts  by  reviewing  the changes in  trade  policy  since  1989 in 
Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Then I present an overall evaluation of 
recent trends in trade flows, paying particular attention to the shortcomings of 
official statistics. The rest of  the paper is devoted to groping for answers to 
four questions. How much trade reorientation  from East to West has really 
taken place? How bad is the Soviet trade shock? What has caused the boom in 
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exports to the West? Has import liberalization fostered price discipline and re- 
structuring? 
18.1  An Overview of Trade Policy Reforms 
The three countries started their reform process from rather different initial 
points. In Hungary, considerable decentralization and market-oriented reform 
had taken place since 1968, with central planning largely discarded and enter- 
prises already having a large degree of autonomy. In Poland, a similar, if more 
recent, process had been under way since the early 1980s. Czechoslovakia, by 
contrast, had retained most of the archetypal characteristics of central planning 
and of state ownership. Since 1989, the process of  economic transformation 
has picked up considerable speed in Poland and Hungary and was started anew 
in Czechoslovakia. 
Despite the differences in initial conditions and in the timing and speed of 
reforms, the trade regimes of  the three countries looked quite similar by the 
end of  199  1, In all three countries, trade is now demonopolized, and licensing 
and quotas play  a very small role. Exchange controls have virtually disap- 
peared  for current account transactions.  As in  market economies, the main 
instruments of trade control have become tariffs and the exchange rate. Aver- 
age tariffs are low relative to countries at similar levels of development (and in 
the case of Czechoslovakia compare very favorably with those of the industri- 
alized countries). The exchange rate is managed in a “realistic” fashion, and 
the black  market premium  is contained well within 20 percent in Hungary, 
while it has virtually disappeared in the other two countries (table 18.1). In all 
three countries, some of the more important remaining quantitative restrictions 
(QRs) are those exercised in connection with the VERs (voluntary export re- 
straints) imposed on them by the European Community, the United States, and 
some others. This irony highlights the dramatic liberalization that has taken 
place since 1989. 
Appendix A provides a short summary of the main reforms and describes 
the current makeup of trade policies in each of the three countries (as of De- 
cember  1991). Here, I emphasize only some of the main features and differ- 
ences. 
The major trade reforms in Poland and Czechoslovakia were undertaken 
simultaneously with their respective “big bangs”-at  the beginning of 1990 in 
Poland and of 1991 in Czechoslovakia. Hungary’s reforms were introduced in 
a more gradual fashion. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the speed of reform 
appears to have had little effect on the end product. While the scope of licens- 
ing and QRs remains broader in Hungary, the difference is one of degree, not 
one of kind. Also, the other two countries have not been shy in tinkering with 
their commercial policies as circumstances have demanded. Czechoslovakia 
introduced a surcharge on consumer goods at the beginning of 1991, but then 
proceeded to reduce it when it became apparent that import demand had been Table 18.1  Exchange Rates, Official and Parallel 
Hungary  Poland  Czechoslovakia 
Off. (Ft/$)  Para. (Ft/$) Prem. (%)  Off. (ZV$)  Para. (ZI/$)  Prem. (%)  Off. (Kfs)  Para. (KEs)  Prem. (%) 
1988  50.4  43  1  1.979  359  14.36  33.40  i33 
1989  59.1  1,446  5,565  285  15.05  42.39  i82 
1990:l  64.0  95.1  49  9,500  9,476  -0  16.54  41.14  I 49 
1990:2  64.9  90.9  40  9,500  9,713  2  16.62 
1990:3  62.9  77.7  24  9,500  9,502  0  15.99 
1990:4  61.0  71.4  17  9,500  9,590  1  22.67 
1991:l  70.3  82.5  17  9,500  9,471  -0  27.88  34.10  22 
1991:2  75.9  10,394  10,416  0  30.32  31.80  5 
1991:3  76.3  11,298  11,428  1  30.52  32.40  6 
Sources: GUS (1991~);  Prugur Post, 23 November, 1991; World Bank (1991); and OECD (1991b). 322  Dani Rodrik 
Table 18.2  Share of Import Duties in Central Government Revenue (%) 
Hungary: 
I990  S.7 (import duties only) 
7.5 (including all taxes on imports) 
Poland: 
Jan.-Jul.  1991  5.8 
Aug.-Sep.  1991  13.6 
1991: 1-2 
Czechoslovakia: 
1.9 (import duties only) 
2.4 (import duties + surcharge) 
Sources: OECD (1991b), GUS (1991c), RIFER (1991). 
overestimated. Poland applied temporary tariff suspensions for items covering 
more than 50 percent of tariff lines, in part to ease inflationary pressures. In 
August 1991, it then introduced a new tariff schedule, with higher tariffs, when 
the real appreciation  of the zloty and a growing budget  deficit reversed  the 
political pressures. 
Tariffs average around 13-14  percent in Hungary and Poland (after the re- 
cent change there)  and around 5  percent  in Czechoslovakia.  In Poland,  the 
August  1991 change in the tariff  schedule has helped more than double the 
share of tariff revenues in the government budget (from 6 to 14 percent). But 
some of  this increase can be attributed to the decline  in other tax revenues 
(particularly in enterprise taxes). In the other two countries, tariffs constitute a 
smaller share of budgetary revenues (see table 18.2).' 
With respect to exchange rate policy, Poland's  big bang devaluation on  1 
January  1990 eliminated  the parallel  market  premium overnight. This was 
achieved by raising the official rate to the level of the parallel rate. The ex- 
change rate  has  remained  unified  since then  (table  18.1). In  Hungary  and 
Czechoslovakia, the strategy has been somewhat different. In both these cases, 
unification  has been  more gradual  and achieved  in part  by  increases  in the 
official rate and in part by a decrease in the parallel rate (as a consequence of 
the restrictive monetary and fiscal policies in place). This can be seen in the 
data presented in table 18.1. In Hungary, restrictive macro policies during 1990 
helped squeeze the parallel market premium even though the official rate was 
constant. By the end of the year, the premium was below 20 percent. In view 
of the remaining restrictions on the convertibility of the forint, the remaining 
premium is modest and does not indicate a fundamental misalignment of the 
exchange rate. In Czechoslovakia, a similar downward movement in the paral- 
lel rate is also visible. A devaluation in December 1990 and highly restrictive 
1. Foreign firms are an  important constituency pushing for higher tariffs; they  desire greater 
protection in exchange for direct investment. This has been especially marked in the auto sector. 323  Foreign Trade in Eastern Europe’s Transition: Early Results 
macro policies in 1991 have led to the virtual disappearance of the premium 
by the second quarter of  1991  .z 
Compared to gradualism, instant exchange rate unification as in Poland may 
have had an important cost: the unification in Poland had to take place at the 
level of  the parallel rate and may therefore have entailed overdevaluation. In 
general, the preunification parallel rate will be too depreciated in view of the 
macroeconomic stabilization measures to be put in place subsequently. Such 
measures can be expected to pull the parallel rate down by reducing aggregate 
demand. And, as mentioned above, this is what has happened in both Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia. Hence, the price paid by  Poland for instant unification 
may have been overdevaluation. Whether this was a price worth paying to stop 
a developing hyperinflation is another question. I return to this issue below. 
The real exchange rate has appreciated considerably in Poland since the big 
bang, as a consequence of continued, if reduced, inflation. The same has hap- 
pened in Hungary also. Czechoslovakia, the country with the greatest degree 
of success in stabilizing the price level, has also had more success on this front: 
it has managed to maintain most of the real depreciation achieved by the deval- 
uation at the end of December 1990. Real exchange rate indices are shown in 
table 18.3. 
As a consequence of these reforms, there has been a substantial expansion 
of private activity in trade, especially on the import side. In Poland, close to 
half of imports and around  15 percent of exports were undertaken by private 
entities by  late 1991 (up from 20 percent and 5 percent, respectively, in the 
first quarter of  1990). The number of private companies engaged in trade has 
mushroomed, from 2,809 in March  1990 to 12,598 in June 1991, an increase 
of 350 percent (Guzman 1991). In Czechoslovakia, the trade sector is the most 
buoyant one in terms of private activity. The number of registered private entre- 
preneurs in “commerce” has increased from 61,533 (12.6 percent of all regis- 
tered entrepreneurs) at the end of  1990 to 222,804 (19.7 percent) at the end of 
September 1991. As we shall see in the next section, this mushrooming of 
private activity is causing problems for trade statistics. 
Since the beginning of 199  1, trade among the former members of the CMEA 
has been carried out in dollars and in accordance with the same principles as 
those that apply to trade with the West. The transferable ruble, in which trade 
was denominated prior to 199  1, has been abandoned, save for the fulfillment 
of  accounts left over from  1990: according to national statistics for the first 
three quarters of 199 1, trade amounting to some 15 percent of the correspond- 
ing value for 1990 was still camed out in transferable rubles, but this trade is 
2. Tourists were offered KEs  36.00 to the dollar on the streets of Prague in November 1991, 
when the official rate was  KEs 28.00.  (The transaction is illegal, unlike in  Poland.) However, 
the gap apparently reflects overzealous entrepreneurial behavior, not economic fundamentals: the 
unsuspecting tourist receives a wad of bills that look like koruny but are actually Polish zlotys 
(with an effective rate of KEs 0.10 to the dollar)! 324  Dani Rodrik 
Table 18.3  Real Exchange Rate Indices 
Hungary  Poland  Czechoslovakia 
1988 
1989 
1990:  I 
I990:2 





100.0  100.0 
100.2  95.2 
89.8  122.7 
88.2  105.4 
81.2  89.7 
76.  I  75.6 












Note: The real exchange rate is calculated by dividing the nominal exchange rate (home currency 
per dollar) by the CPI. An increase signifies a real depreciation of the home currency. 
being phased out fast. The obligatory trade protocols of the past have now been 
replaced by  indicative lists, covering much smaller quantities of trade. Soviet 
authorities initially prohibited all barter arrangements, but the prohibition was 
later rescinded, and there has been some revival in barter deals during the sec- 
ond half of 1991. The switch to dollar pricing for the bulk of trade has implied 
substantial terms-of-trade losses for East European countries vis-a-vis the So- 
viet Union. These losses will be discussed further below. 
Last but not least, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia signed association 
agreements  with  the  European Community in  December  1991. Under  the 
agreement, the EC recognizes the objective of these countries to become full 
members of  the EC in ten years and has granted a number of important trade 
concessions. VERs on steel products are to be eliminated as of 1992. On prod- 
ucts subject to variable levies (such as meat), the EC will undertake three equal 
cuts of 20 percent each year in duties and variable levies, and quotas will be 
increased  (again in equal amounts) by  10 percent  for five years. Quotas on 
textiles and clothing will be increased by 50 percent or more in  1992, with a 
complete elimination  phased  according to the MFA  (Multi-Fibre  Arrange- 
ment) regime to be negotiated in the Uruguay  Round, but over a period not 
exceeding five years. These measures represent a substantial opportunity for 
the three countries in what is already their most important export market. In 
return, the East European countries are not expected to implement their tariff 
reductions until 1995. 
18.2  Developments in Eastern Europe’s Trade 
Table 18.4  summarizes recent developments in the external trade of the three 
countries, as well as can be pieced together from national sources. The table 
distinguishes between trade with the formerly socialist economies (FSEs) and 
trade with market economies (MEs). With respect to the former, an immediate 
difficulty is the valuation of trade carried out in transferable rubles (TRs) prior 325  Foreign Trade in Eastern Europe’s Transition: Early Results 
to 1991 and the comparison of convertible-currency trade with TR trade. For 
1989 and 1990, I have converted TR values to dollars by  using the CMEA TR/ 
dollar rate set by  the International Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC) 
(around TR 0.65/$1.00).  Hence, the table presents changes in the implicit dol- 
lar value of trade with the FSEs. Where available, volume indices are presented 
also. The former East Germany has been included in the ME group in calculat- 
ing the figures for 1991. While these data are subject to a number of problems 
(to be discussed below), some of  the broad trends that they reveal are unmis- 
takable. 
First, there has been a rapid downward spiral in trade with former CMEA 
Table 18.4  Recent Trends in Eastern Europe’s Trade (% change from 
corresponding period previous year) 
Formerly 
Socialist Economyd  Market Economy  Totalb 
1990  199Ic  1990  1991‘  1990  1991= 
Exports 
Value ($): 
Poland  -.4  -87.5  40.9  6.7  11.8  -1.8 
Czechoslovakia  -  18.9  -76.4  7.9  -1.2  -17.0  -13.3 
Hungary  -  17.3  -74.4  19.3  11.3  .8  .4 
Volume: 
Poland  -13.3  -44.0  40.5  19.36  13.7  -5.6 
Czechoslovakia  -20.1  (-50.0)’  15.1  -5.9  -25.0‘ 
Hungary  -27.0  13.0 
Imports 
Value ($): 
Poland  -25.6  -75.9  6.3  73.9  -2.5  64.7 
Czechoslovakia  -7.3  -70.6  20.5  -24.9  -7.0  -23.6 
Hungary  -9.8  -51.0  14.6  38.4  -.l  34.3 
Volume: 
Poland  -34.1  -45.0  2.9  89.Id  -17.9  41.3 
Czechoslovakia  -11.5  (-33.0)’  34.7  6.4  -28.0‘ 
Hungary  -  18.0  4.0 
Sources: GUS (1991b. 1991c),  FSU (1991a), PlanEcon (1991). GATT (1991). and tables provided 
by the Embassy of the Republic of Hungary. 
#For 1989 and 1990, dollar values are calculated by  using the IBEC exchange rate between TR 
and dollars rather than implicit national cross-rates. For 1991,  the former East Germany is included 
in market economies, and growth rates are calculated accordingly. 
bCalculated by  converting national currency values to U.S.  dollars at period-average exchange 
rates. Owing to the difference between the IBEC and national cross-rates between TR and dollars, 
these figures are inconsistent with those for the FSEs in the first two columns of  the table. 
‘January-September. 
dEC  only. 
‘PlanEcon estimate, for trade with the Soviet Union only 
‘January-June. 326  Dani Rodrik 
trade partners. The cumulative decline in the dollar value of  exports to the 
former CMEA since the beginning of  1990 has been on the order of  80-90 
percent and is nothing less than monumental. Declines in volume terms are 
somewhat smaller, indicating a fall in (implicit) dollar prices in intra-CMEA 
trade. Soviet deliveries of fuels and raw materials have been severely disrupted. 
The volume of Soviet petroleum exports to East European countries declined 
by 23 percent in 1990 and is estimated to have declined by a further 53 percent 
in 1991 (IMF 1991a). As shown in table 18.5, the collapse of  trade with the 
Soviet Union has been accompanied by  substantial terms-of-trade losses. Po- 
land’s terms of trade with its former CMEA partners has deteriorated by  48 
percent in the first nine months of  1991, and similar numbers are plausible for 
the other two countries also. 
Second, some of the decline in trade with the East has been offset by  an 
increase in trade with the West. Just to point out some of the more remarkable 
numbers in the table, Poland’s exports to the West rose by 41 percent in 1990, 
while its imports were up by 74 percent in 1991. Hungary’s imports from the 
West have  increased by  38 percent in 1991, while its exports have been ex- 
panding at less remarkable but still healthy rates. Czechoslovakia seems to be 
an outlier, as both its exports and its imports appear to have fallen in 1991 after 
a respectable performance the previous year.  However, this evidence is not 
borne out by the statistics of Czechoslovakia’s trade partners: the latter show a 
continuation of the upward trend, rather than a reversal (see below). 
The Czechoslovak case is symptomatic of a general problem with these sta- 
tistics. As a consequence of  the reforms discussed above and of  the mush- 
rooming of  private traders in particular, a considerable part of  trade appears 
not to be recorded. Previously, central statistical offices collected trade statis- 
tics directly from the small number of state trading organizations permitted to 
undertake trade. The demonopolization of  trade has required new modes of 
data collection, which these countries have now introduced. But, at least in the 
Table 18.5  Terms of ’Ikade (% change from corresponding period previous year) 
1989  1990  1991 
~~  ~~ 
Poland  18.5  -  17.2  -  10.P 
In trade with CMEA  5.7  4.2  -48.2 
Hungary  2.8  .1  N.A. 
In trade with CMEA  3.6  7.6  -333 
Czechoslovakia  4.3  2.3  -27.7‘ 
In trade with CMEA  6.1  2.5  N.A. 
Sources: GUS (1991b). OECD (1991b), FSU (1991b). 
aJanuar-September. 
bMidpoint of the estimates reported for Soviet trade in Oblath and Tan (1991). based on  1990 
quantities. 
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Table 18.6  Comparisons of Home- and Partner-Country Trade Statistics (% 
change in dollar value of trade with market economies) 
Exports  Imports 
Source  1990  1991:l  1990  1991:l 
Poland: 
National statistics  40.9  16.3 
IMF statistics  39.5  13.3 
National statistics  12.9  -  19.0 
OECD statistics  17.3  11.7 
National statistics  19.3  9.6b 
IMF statistics  15.5  5.9 
Czechoslovakia:” 
Hungary: 
6.3  68.8 
12.8  84.5 
21.5  -32.3 
32.4  29.2 
14.6  38.0b 
23.4  16.2 
Sources: Same as in table 18.4 plus IMF (1991b) and OECD (1991a). 
dTrade  with OECD only (including Yugoslavia). 
bl  99  1  :  1-2. 
case of Czechoslovakia, these changes appear to have made statistics even less 
reliable in the short run.3 
Table  18.6 compares official  figures  with  those  obtained  from  partner- 
country data. For Poland and Hungary, the partner data are the exports and 
imports reported by developed and developing countries in the IMF’s Direction 
of  Trade Statistics  (DOTS). As  DOTS  does  not  give  a  separate  entry  for 
Czechoslovakia, I use the totals reported by  OECD countries in the OECD 
Monthly Statistics of  Foreign Trade in this case. In each case, exports (imports) 
of the East European country are matched with imports from (exports to) that 
particular country reported by these groups. As the figures show percentage 
changes, c.i.flf.0.b. valuation differences should not affect the comparisons. 
However, since national statistics are converted to dollars at period-average 
exchange rates, some statistical discrepancies are possible on this account. An- 
other source of discrepancy is due to the time that goods spend in transit (and 
during which they are recorded as exports by one country but not as imports 
by another). Finally, note that only the first quarter of  1991 is covered by the 
comparisons,  as  the  most  recent  (aggregate)  data available from IMF and 
OECD sources at the time of  writing (December  1991) did not go beyond 
1991:l. 
On the export side, table  18.6 shows that the trends revealed by home and 
partner data are reasonably close to each other, with the striking exception of 
3. The Czechoslovak monthly foreign trade bulletin puts it bluntly: “The data do not reflect real 
exports and imports in the reported period but only those exports and imports for which arrive 
[sic] completed proposals for customs procedure. . . . As a result of the above mentioned differ- 
ences, the surveyed data in  1991 can be compared to the data of the previous year (1990) only for 
rough orientation” (Federal Statistical Office, Foreign Trade [Month 19911, 3). 328  Dani Rodrik 
Czechoslovak exports in 1991:  1. According to Czechoslovak statistics, exports 
to the OECD fell by  19 percent  in  1991:1, while OECD statistics show an 
increase of  12 percent.  In the  other two countries,  increases  in exports are 
somewhat higher according to official statistics, but the discrepancies are no- 
where as large and can be accounted for by the factors mentioned above. 
On the import side, home statistics almost consistently  understate  the in- 
crease in imports from the West and typically by nonnegligible margins. The 
growth of Poland’s imports, for example, appears to have been twice as large 
in  1990 as was reported in table  18.4.4 This is consistent with anecdotal evi- 
dence, such as  widespread  stories of  enterprising  individuals  coming back 
from Germany with their cars full of consumer goods for resale at home. Since 
the bulk of  private activity in trade has taken place in imports, it is not a sur- 
prise to find the discrepancies mostly on the import side. Once again, however, 
the  magnitude  of  the Czechoslovak  discrepancy  is  noteworthy:  while  the 
Czechoslovak  statistics  show  a  decline of  32 percent  in  imports from the 
OECD in 1991:  1, the OECD statistics show an increase of 29 percent! 
In view of the large discrepancies in Czechoslovak statistics, table 18.7 dis- 
plays the comparative data at the level of individual countries. I have selected 
here important trade partners for which OECD data were available through the 
first half  of  1991 so that  we can  also see whether the discrepancies extend 
beyond  199  1  :  1. The answer seems to be yes. On the whole, both imports and 
exports appear to be greatly underreported in Czechoslovak statistics. Some of 
the discrepancies  on the import side in particular are extremely large: while 
France  reports  an  increase  in  exports  to  Czechoslovakia  of  180 percent, 
Czechoslovakia’s own statistics suggest an increase of only 2 percent! 
What conclusions can we therefore draw from these comparisons concern- 
ing trade with the West? First, it seems evident that Czechoslovak trade statis- 
tics for 1991 are not reliable and hence that the  1991 declines in trade with 
the West reported in table 18.4 should not be taken seriously. Second, official 
statistics considerably understate the volume of imports from the West in all 
three countries. Third, while imports appear to have been increasing at impres- 
sive rates in I99  I  (especially in Poland), export performance is not as solid in 
1991 as it had been the previous year. In Poland, the 1990 export boom has 
fizzled out (and has been replaced  by  an import boom). In Hungary,  a less 
impressive import boom is in place also, while exports have not expanded as 
rapidly in 1991 as in the previous year. 
We finally look at trade balances, which are shown in table 18.8. Two points 
are noteworthy here. First, in all three countries, the balance with the FSEs 
(mainly the Soviet Union) deteriorated significantly in 1991, with surpluses in 
1990 turning into deficits in Poland and Hungary and a small deficit growing 
sixfold in Czechoslovakia. These deficits reflect the deterioration in the terms 
4. On the underreporting of  Poland’s imports in  1990, see also Berg and Sachs (1991), who, 
however, report a larger discrepancy. 329  Foreign Trade in Eastern Europe’s Transition: Early Results 
Table 18.7  Czechoslovak ’Ikade with Leading OECD Partners, 1991:l-2  (% 
change from 199O:l-2) 
~  ~~ 
Exports  Imports 
CSFR Data  OECD Data  CSFR Data  OECD Data 
Partner 
Germany  15.8  21.5  -22.6  6.0 
Italy  19.0  19.0  28.8  33.6 
Yugoslavia  61.8  72.1  -26.4  1.1 
France  -11.4  -1.1  2.0  179.9 
Netherlands  6.7  21.3  14.8  20.1 
United Kingdom  -40.2  -13.0  -51.8  2.0 
Sources: Same as in table 18.6. 
Table 18.8  Trade Balances 
Formerly Socialist Economies  Market Economies 
Hungary (Ft billion): 
1990  10.9  47.8 
Jan.-Sep.  I99  1  -52.9  -57.0 
I990  8,934  36,608 
Jan.-Sep.  1991  -2,311  3,071 
1990  -  1.43  -6.59 
Jan.-Aug.  1991  -8.26  9.62 
Poland (ZI billion): 
Czechoslovakia (KZs billion): 
of trade that followed the move to dollar pricing and the collapse of exports to 
the Soviet market. Unlike in previous years, these balances are now denomi- 
nated in real money, that is, dollars. (It is still not clear how claims in transfer- 
able rubles that derive from previous surpluses with the Soviet Union will be 
settled.) 
Second, each of  the  three  countries has run  a trade  surplus with  market 
economies during its program’s first year (1990 in Poland and Hungary, 1991 
in  Czechoslovakia).  Poland’s  I990  trade  surplus  was  particularly  large, 
amounting to close to $4 billion. Moreover, in each of these cases, the surplus 
was entirely unanticipated. The Polish stabilization program had predicted a 
trade deficit in convertible-currency  trade of  $0.5 billion for 1990. Similarly, 
the 1991 Czechoslovak program had predicted a current account deficit of $2.5 
billion. Hence, these economies have exhibited early on either an unexpectedly 
strong expenditure reduction or an unexpectedly strong expenditure switching, 
or both. 
The standard economic prescription for a country that is undergoing a one- 
time transition cost is to run trade deficits for a while in order to smooth con- 330  Dani Rodrik 
Table 18.9  Partner Composition of Exports (%) 
Eastern Europea 
Year  EE5  Soviet Union  Total  EC  Others 
Czechoslovakia: 
1985  13.4  33.1  46.5 
1988  17.2  33.4  50.6  16.7  32.7 
1989  16.7  30.5  47.2  18.2  34.6 
1990  13.0  25.2  38.2  26.5  35.3 
Jan.-Sep.  1991  13.0  19.4  32.4  40.1  27.5 
Medium-run predictionb  10.8  14.3  25.1  46.3  28.6 
1985  14.8  28.4  43.2  23.2  33.6 
1988  11.8  24.5  36.3  28.3  35.4 
1989  9.9  20.8  30.7  32.1  37.2 
I990  6.8  15.4  22.2  47.2  30.6 
Jan.-Sep.  1991  6.  I  11.8  17.9  53.3  28.8 
Medium-run predictionh  9.3  13.9  23.2  51.2  25.6 
1985  12.8  33.6  46.4 
1988  11.8  27.6  39.4 
1989  10.5  25.1  35.6  24.9  39.5 
1990  8.0  20.2  28.2  32.2  39.6 
Jan.-Sep.  1991  19.7  45.6  34.7 
Medium-run predictionb  15.0  18.0  33.0  37.2  29.8 
Poland: 
Hungary: 
Sources: Rosati (1991). OECD (1991b). FSU (1991a), GUS (1991a). 
dExcluding  former GDR. 
bFrom Collins and Rodrik (1991). See text for explanation. 
sumption. Since these deficits have not materialized (at least until later on), the 
implication is that the early phase of the transition has been more costly than 
it need have been.5 
18.3  How Much Trade Reorientation Has Really Taken Place? 
The boom  in  trade  with  the  West, combined  with  the  collapse of  intra- 
CMEA trade, suggests that a considerable amount of reorientation has already 
taken place in East European countries’ trade patterns. Statistics using national 
exchange rates vis-2-vis the dollar and the transferable ruble seem to indicate 
that this has been going on for some time now. The figures show a nonnegligi- 
ble reorientation of exports away from the CMEA and toward Western markets 
(the EC in particular) since the mid-1980s in both Poland and Hungary and 
since 1988 in Czechoslovakia as well (table 18.9). The basic trend is one of 
5. A  strong argument can be made that external financing was available for more borrowing 
than took place (see, e.g., “Poland Fails” 1992). 331  Foreign Trade in Eastern Europe’s Transition: Early Results 
sharp reduction in the importance of other Eastern markets (mainly the Soviet 
Union), offset by an equivalent increase in the importance of the EC. Between 
1985 and 1990, Hungary and Poland both reduced their shares of exports going 
to the Soviet Union by almost 14 percentage points; the shares of the EC mean- 
while doubled. Czechoslovakia has undergone the slowest transformation, and 
the importance of Eastern markets remains much higher in this country than 
in the other two. 
However, these pre-1991 figures are somewhat suspect. The reason has to 
do with the conversion rates used in translating exports in transferable rubles 
(TR) to the national currency. It is well recognized that national exchange rates 
against the TR have been rather arbitrary, rendering comparison of flows to the 
dollar area and the ruble area problematic. This in itself would not affect the 
trends in trade shares over time. But, in both Hungary and Poland, changes 
in the national exchange rates vis-2-vis the TR and the dollar have implied a 
depreciation of the TR against the dollar (Table 18.10). In part, these changes 
were motivated by the authorities’ desire to discourage exports to the Soviet 
Union and to reduce trade surpluses in nonconvertible-currency  trade. Conse- 
quently, the decline in Hungary’s and Poland’s CMEA trade is overstated rela- 
tive to that in Czechoslovakia (where the cross-rate has remained more stable 
since 1985). 
These considerations no longer apply to the trade figures for 1991, as the 
bulk of trade with the East began to be carried out in dollars in that year. These 
later figures show that former CMEA markets now receive less than a fifth of 
Polish and Hungarian exports and about a third of Czechoslovak exports. The 
share of the EC, meanwhile, is greater than 40 percent in all three countries. 
These dramatic changes have occurred faster than predicted. Indeed, the de- 
cline  in  the  Soviet and  former  CMEA markets  has  probably  overshot  the 
longer-run, steady-state market shares. Table 18.9 shows for each country a 
predicted  regional  distribution of  exports at the end of the transition, taken 
from work that Susan Collins and I have done previously (Collins and Rodrik 
1991). These predictions were obtained by updating an interwar (1923) trade 
matrix for these countries using information from the evolution of the trade of 
six comparator countries since them6 Since these predictions make no allow- 
ance for the hysteresis created by four decades of  socialism and integration 
under the CMEA, a reasonable hypothesis is that they overstate the reorienta- 
tion toward the West that will likely take place in the long run. However, in 
the case of  Poland and Hungary, the  1991 results indicate that the realized 
reorientation has already surpassed those ambitious projections. In both coun- 
tries, the share of the CMEA is lower and the share of the EC higher than the 
levels that our method  yields as the most “reasonable” projections over the 
medium run. 
6. The comparator countries are Germany, Austria, Finland, Spain, Italy, and Portugal. For a 
study based on  the gravity model, see also Wang and Winters (1991), the results of  which are 
broadly similar to those of Collins and Rodrik (1991). 332  Dani Rodrik 
Table 18.10  Implicit Ruble-Dollar Exchange Rates, Based on National Rates 
(TI@) 
Hungary  Poland  Czechoslovakia 
1985  1.88  1.76  1.85 
1988  I .94  2.21  I .44 
1989  2.09  2.96  1.51 
1990  2.30  4.52  1.79 
ratio of  1990 rate to  1985 rate  I .22  2.57  .97 
Suurce: Rosati (1991). 
Impressive as they may be, these statistics do not really  inform us of the 
extent to which enterprises have been able to shift sales from Eastern to West- 
em markets, for these outcomes are also consistent with sharp reductions in 
the kinds of products exported to the East and sharp increases in products ex- 
ported to the West, with no real reorientation of trade, save in a statistical sense. 
Evidence indicates that  a considerable  share of  manufactured products pre- 
viously  exported to the East is unmarketable in the West, at any price.  Ex- 
amples are computer products that are several generations old and manufactur- 
ing activities specifically geared to Soviet standards (e.g., tramcars).’ 
In principle, it would be possible to see how much reorientation has taken 
place at the product level by examining highly disaggregated trade data. Here, 
I analyze somewhat aggregate product categories, exploiting the differences in 
the product composition of exports to the two areas. 
I focus on Hungary and Poland, which are the candidates for the greatest 
reorientation. Tables 18.11 and  18.12 show the product composition of  these 
countries’ exports to the East and the West for 1990 and for either 1985 (Po- 
land) or 1986 (Hungary). The data show large differences in product composi- 
tion with respect to the two areas. Machinery has constituted almost half of 
Hungarian exports to the ruble area but less than 15 percent of exports to the 
West. Exports of raw materials to the West have been twice as important as 
exports to the East. In Poland, electroengineering  products constitute three- 
quarters of exports to the East but less than a third of exports to the West. 
Such differences allow us to check for reorientation of trade at the product 
level. If  these countries have been successful  at redirecting their Eastern ex- 
ports to the West, we would see a certain convergence in the product composi- 
tion of  exports to the two areas. A quick look at the tables suggests that no 
convergence has in fact occurred since the mid- 1980s, despite the remarkable 
decline  in the  overall share of exports to the East as discussed above. The 
shares of machinery  and electroengineering exports to the West, in Hungary 
7. For an argument that East-West trade is likely to remain small on account of  the East’s spe- 
cialization in low-quality goods for which the West has little demand and no comparative advan- 
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Table 18.11  Hungary: Product Composition  of Exports by  Area (%) 
Ruble Area  Nonruble Area 
1986  1990  1986  1990 
Energy, elect.  .6  .3  3.4  3.3 
Raw materials  22.3  20.8  38.9  43.8 
Machinery  46.0  43.9  14.5  11.6 
Ind. consumer  16.7  19.1  16.4  15.6 
Food  14.3  15.9  26.9  25.7 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: OECD (1991b). 
Table 18.12  Poland: Product Composition of Industrial Exports by Area (%) 
Ruble Area  Nonruble Area 

















2.1  19.5  21.9 
76.2  30.0  29.2 
14.8  17.6  15.3 
.6  I .8  2.5 
.6  4.6  6.1 
3.0  9.5  9.2 
1.8  16.1  15.0 
.9  .8  .8 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: GUS (1991a). 
and Poland, respectively, were lower in  1990 than in the mid-1980s. Hence, 
there is no evidence that the overall increase in trade with the West was fueled 
by redirecting Eastern sales to the West or indeed that the latter played any role 
at all in the former. 
To  make this conclusion a bit more precise, table 18.13 shows an index of 
similarity of  trade with the two partner  groups. This index is calculated  as 
1 -  C(q  -  a:)*,where  u  denotes shares of  product categories in exports,  i 
indexes product categories, and e and w stand for East and West, respectively. 
The index takes values between zero (completely dissimilar product composi- 
tion of trade) and one (identical product composition). The index is calculated 
for the mid-1980s and for 1990. In addition, a hypothetical calculation is pre- 
sented under the assumption that all the actual decline in trade with the East 
was diverted to the West. This hypothetical calculation shows the maximum 
value that the index would take if the reorientation from East to West had been 
complete. The following steps go into the calculation: (i) I assume a count- 334  Dani Rodrik 
Hungary: 
1986  ,856 
1990  .832 
1990“  ,949 
Table 18.13  Index of Product Similarity in Trade in East and West 
Poland: 
1985  ,755 
1990  ,716 
1990“  ,900 
erfactual scenario in which exports to the East and West increase by an identi- 
cal proportion,  corresponding  to the aggregate  growth rate in exports. (ii) I 
calculate the “shortfall” in exports to the East in 1990, by product category, by 
subtracting the realized level of exports from the counterfactual level. (iii) This 
shortfall is then added to the exports that go to the West under the counterfac- 
tual scenario, to arrive at a hypothetical structure of exports to the West under 
full diversion. 
The values of the indexes in table  18.13 bear out the previous conclusion 
from eyeballing the statistics. Not only do the values of the index come no- 
where  near  the  hypothetical  values  that  they  would  take  under  the  full- 
reorientation scenario, but they actually decline in both countries. While more 
disaggregated analysis could show some areas where diversion has occurred, 
the conclusion has to be that very little overall reorientation has taken place, 
even in the two countries where the shares of Eastern markets have exhibited 
the steepest declines. Moreover, a look at more recent export statistics for 199  1 
does not change these conclusions. 
18.4  How Bad Is the Soviet Trade Shock? 
The transition to dollar pricing in Soviet trade in 1991 and the sharp decline 
in exports to that market have wreaked havoc with the economies of all three 
countries. The effects show in many different ways. Alongside the collapse in 
exports has come increases in unemployment  and reductions  in profitability. 
Table 18.14 shows the Polish situation: industrial exports to the Soviet Union 
have fallen by 40 percent when evaluated at dollar prices implicit in the na- 
tional cross-rate between the TR and the dollar and by more than 90 percent 
when evaluated at the former IBEC exchange rate. From the perspective  of 
domestic activity and profitability, the former figure is perhaps the more rele- 
vant one, but even with that the decline in sales is very significant. 
With the decline in enterprise profitability, the tax base of the government 
has shrunk. In Poland, the deterioration in the fiscal situation during 1991 can 
be attributed in large part to the reduction in enterprise taxes. In Czechoslova- 
kia, fiscal revenues have also been reduced in the second half of  the year. 
Meanwhile, the increase in prices of raw materials and energy imports rela- 
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income to the Soviet Union. The sharp increase in the (domestic) price of raw 
materials has also affected adversely energy- and raw-material-intensive ex- 
ports to the West, in pharmaceuticals and petrochemicals, for example. 
A comparison of economic outcomes in the Czech and Slovak republics 
highlights the devastating effect of the Soviet trade shock. Such a comparison 
is instructive because the two republics are quite different in the extent of their 
reliance on Soviet trade. As table 18.15 shows, the Czech Republic has twice 
the population and more than twice the income of  the Slovak Republic, yet the 
volume of  trade with the  Soviet Union  is comparable in the two republics. 
Exports to the Soviet Union are only 60  percent lower in the Slovak Republic, 
while the volume of imports is actually higher. 
The greater orientation  toward  the  Soviet market in the Slovak  Republic 
finds reflection in a much worse economic performance compared to the Czech 
Republic. Starting from similar macroeconomic positions in mid- 1990, output 
and employment trends in the two republics have diverged greatly. By the end 
of  1991, the Slovak unemployment rate was more than double the Czech rate, 
and the industrial recession  was considerably  deeper (table  18.15). The gap 
between the two regions has continued  to widen since mid- 1990, indicating 
(i)  that  the  difference  is  intimately  linked  to  the  Soviet  trade  shock  and 
(ii) that, as of the third quarter of  1991, the costs of  the Soviet trade shock had 
not been fully paid yet. 
Conceptually, the Soviet trade shock consists of three independent  shocks 
that are frequently lumped together: a terms-of-trade  shock, a removal of an 
implicit import subsidy in Soviet trade, and a market-loss effect. Appendix B 
discusses these shocks in a more analytic manner (see also Rodrik 1992). 
Table 18.14  Poland’s Exports to the Soviet Union ($ million) 
























I ,5 10.9 
71.1 




82.8  -34.5 
1,102.1  -40.0 
5.5  -93.3 
666.5  -50.8 
249.3  22.3 
0.4  -95.9 
44.9  -70.8 
131.2  279.2 
51.5  -22.9 
58.8  54.2 










Total  2,069.2  15,332.8  1,295.2  -  37.4  -9  I .6 
Note: Zloty values converted to dollars using (A) the official exchange rate (ZI 9,500/$1.00) or (B) 
the implied Zloty/dollar rate in trade with the ruble area (9,500 X 4.52/0.61). 
dFirst  three quarters multiplied by 4/3. 336  Dani Rodrik 
Table 18.15  Comparison of Economic Performance in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics 
Czech Republic  Slovak Republic  Ratio 
Imports from Soviet Union (Jan.-Aug. 
Exports to Soviet Union (Jan.-Aug. 
Population (million) 
Money income of population (1 990, 
Industrial output (same year, previous 
199  I, KEs million) 
1991, KEs million) 
KEs billion) 























































































Sources: FSU (1991b) and Statisticke Prehledy (1991). 
The first of  these is a conventional terms-of-trade trade (TOT) shock. As 
pointed out earlier, with the transition to dollar pricing, border prices of exports 
have fallen relative to border prices of imports. The TOT shock has come about 
primarily because dollar export prices to the Soviet Union have fallen. Unlike 
what is often claimed, implicit dollar prices charged by  the Soviet Union for 
oil and other energy exports have in fact not risen greatly: under the CMEA 
moving-average pricing mechanism, Soviet oil export prices had been higher 337  Foreign Trade in Eastern Europe’s Transition: Early Results 
Table 18.16  Pricing of Crude Oil Imports in Poland, 1990 
Domestic Prices  Border Prices 
Volume of Imports 
Source of Imports  (million barrels)  ZI  I,OOO/Barrel  $/Barrel  TRlBarrel  $/Barrel 
Soviet Union  55.5  27.61  2.91  13.32  21.83 
Others  40.8  -  240.76  25.34  ...  25.34 
Total  96.3  117.96  12.42  ...  23.32 
Source: Own calculations from value and volume statistics in  1990 trade yearbook, using IBEC 
and Polish cross-rates between the TR and the dollar. 
than world prices between  1986 and 1989 and became only slightly lower in 
1990 owing to the jump in world market prices after the Gulf crisis in August. 
Nonetheless, the domestic price of oil imported from the Soviet Union did 
increase substantially because the elimination of the TR removed a huge, im- 
plicit subsidy on imports from the CMEA area. The subsidy arose from the 
discrepancy between the internal cross-rate between the TR and the dollar and 
the rate used by  the IBEC in translating a five-year moving average of  world 
(dollar) prices into TRs. Compared to the IBEC rate of TR 0.61/$1.00 in 1990, 
the internal rates were  TR  4.52,  2.30,  and  1.79 in  Poland, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia, respectively (table 18.10). Since the ruble was a lot cheaper 
domestically than externally, importers paid only a fraction of  the dollar cost 
of the oil imported from the Soviet Union. Table 18.16 shows that, in Poland, 
where the implicit subsidy was largest, Soviet oil cost domestic users less than 
$3.00 a barrel, while the border price charged by  the Soviet Union was TR 
13.31 (i.e., $21.83). The second effect of the collapse of the CMEA, therefore, 
is the removal of an implicit import subsidy (and export tax) on trade with the 
Soviet Union, which I will call the RS  effect. This is of course a positive shock, 
even though in the short run it has undoubtedly caused distress among enter- 
prises dependent on cheap Soviet oil.* 
The third shock arises from the reduction in the volume of export sales to 
the Soviet market. It involves the loss of rents earned previously from selling 
manufactured products to the Soviet market at prices that were on  average 
double those that  they  would fetch in Western  markets (see the figures in 
Oblath and Tarr  [1991] and FTRI [1991, 135-371).  This market-loss (ML) 
effect operates independently from the TOT effect and would be present even 
if the terms of trade had not deteriorated. However, the deterioration has clearly 
squeezed the margin between dollar prices in the Soviet Union and those in 
world markets. So, in practice, there is a certain degree of arbitrariness in at- 
tributing the Soviet trade shock separately to the TOT and ML effects. 
8. The import subsidy served the purpose of restraining ruble trade surpluses, which was a 
sensible objective as long as these surpluses were not convertible. For more details and a formal 
model, see Rodrik (1992). 338  Dani Rodrik 
Table 18.17  Estimates of the Soviet Trade Shock, 1990-91  (billions of dollars, 
unless otherwise noted) 
Poland  Hungary  Czechoslovakia 
Basic data 
Imports from Soviet Union (1990) (A) 
Changes in priccs in Soviet trade (%): 
Terms of trade 
Export prices ($) 
Import prices (B) 
Ratio of ruble imports to exports (1990) 
Changes in prices adjusted for worthless ruble surpluses 
in 1990 (%): 
Terms of trade 







Price premium in Soviet market (%): 
Value of ruble exports to Soviet Union: 
Change in export volume to Soviet Union (%): 
Increase in domestic prices of energy (8)  (J) 
Value of energy imports from Soviet Union at domestic 
Reduction in energy use by  subsidized users (%) (L) 
Estimates of  the Soviet trade shock 
Market-loss effect (ML) (1990). D X  F X H 
Market-loss effect (ML) (1991), E X G X I 
Terms-of-trade effect (TOT) (1991),  A  X (C -  B) 
Removal-of-subsidy effect (RS) (1991), Y2  X  J  X  K  X L 
Cumulative 1990-91  shock 
(As % of GDP) 
Ruble trade surplus at domestic prices 
Cumulative 1990-91  shock at domestic prices 
(As O/c  of GDP) 
prices (K) 
7.840  5.467 
-48.2  -33.5 
-46.4  -41.6 
-3.5  -12.2 
,687  ,824 
-24.6  -19.3 
-27.2  -29.1 
50.1  44.1 
3.7  3.3 
12.450  8.696 
10.794  6.348 
-13.3  -27.0 
-44.0  -45.0 
615.1  231.0 
301  .668 
27.1  11.5 
-.83  -1.05 
-.I8  -.09 
-  1.86  -.92 
.67  .09 
-2.20  -  1.97 
(-3.46)  (-7.82) 
.39  .30 
-2.59  -2.27 


























Source: Rodrik (1992) 
Table 18.17, based on Rodrik (1992), presents some estimates of the income 
losses suffered by  the three countries on account of the TOT, ML, and RS 
 effect^.^  Before  discussing  the  results,  three  methodological  issues  deserve 
comment. 
First, as mentioned  above, it is not possible to draw an airtight distinction 
between the TOT and the ML effects in actual calculations involving discrete 
9. For other (partial) estimates of these losses, the reader is referred to Berg and Sachs (1991). 
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(as opposed to infinitesimal) changes. If  the TOT effect is calculated on the 
basis  of  base-year  (1990) trade  volumes,  then,  in  order  to  avoid  double- 
counting, the ML effect would have  to be calculated using end-year (1991) 
margins between prices in Soviet and alternative markets. Alternatively and 
equivalently, we  could calculate the TOT effect on the basis of  1991 trade 
volumes and use the 1990 price margin for the ML effect. The first option is 
followed in this table. Note also that the ML effect is calculated for both 1990 
and 199  1, as it was operative even before the transition to dollar pricing at the 
beginning of  199  1. 
Second, there is the issue of conversion from TRs into dollars. For calculat- 
ing welfare costs, the appropriate valuation of trade is in terms of world prices. 
Using the IBEC exchange rate to convert TR values into dollars yields the 
implicit border prices (in dollars) used in  Soviet trade (as explained in app. 
B). Using any other exchange rate (such as the internal cross-rate) would be 
inappropriate, in view of the pricing rules followed in CMEA trade, and would 
confuse the external terms of trade with an internal taxhbsidy scheme. That 
the IBEC rate may have been “unrealistic” in valuing the ruble too highly is 
beside the point in this context. Where East European countries are concerned, 
the  trading  opportunities among  CMEA  countries were  defined  by  these 
“world” prices, no matter how inflated in dollar terms they may have been. One 
complication that arises, however, is the nonconvertibility of trade surpluses in 
TRs. We  do have to adjust for the fact that ruble trade surpluses could not be 
redeemed at anything approaching the IBEC exchange rate. So the results in 
table 18.17 are based on the assumption that ruble surpluses in 1990 were in 
fact entirely worthless. This assumption calls for scaling down the “effective” 
dollar price of  exports in  1990 by  a factor that equals the ratio of  recorded 
imports to exports (Rodrik 1992). 
Third, the available data are incomplete and in  some cases unreliable. In 
order to present a full set of  estimates, I have occasionally had to rely on ex- 
trapolations, especially where Czechoslovakia is concerned (for details, see 
Rodrik  1992). So the results presented in table 18.17 are, at best, tentative. 
However, I have generally made the assumptions that would make the Soviet 
shock appear less costly. The results are therefore likely to represent a lower 
bound on the magnitude of the shock. 
The numbers in table 18.17 show that the three effects combined amount to 
a huge loss of income (on impact) in the three countries, even on conservative 
assumptions-$2.2  billion in Poland, $2.0 billion in Hungary, and $3.4 billion 
in Czechoslovakia. These losses represent 7-8  percent of GDP in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia and 3Yz percent of  GDP in Poland. Taking Keynesian multi- 
plier effects into account, the Soviet shock could easily “account” for a large 
part of the cumulative decline in GDP in Hungary and Czechoslovakia during 
1990-91. The shock plays a comparatively small role in Poland, as Soviet trade 
is less important in this larger economy. 
It should be  stressed again that these numbers are somewhat shaky and 340  Dani Rodrik 
based on incomplete data. But, in view of the conservative assumptions made 
here,  it  is  unlikely  that  revised  estimates  would  change these  conclusions 
greatly. Hence, there can be little doubt of the devastating effect of the demise 
of the CMEA in the short run. 
18.5  What Caused the Boom in Exports to the West? 
As discussed above, export performance in Western markets has been quite 
good in all three countries (provided that we rely on OECD statistics in the 
case of Czechoslovakia). In fact, this performance has been much better than 
most analysts had predicted on the basis of well-known problems with product 
quality and rigidities in enterprise behavior, What were the reasons for this? 
Some of the contributing factors can be listed as follows. First, the external 
environment was very favorable. By the beginning of 1990, the EC had abol- 
ished its discriminatory quantitative restrictions on these countries’ exports 
(except  in  the  “sensitive”  areas  of  agriculture,  steel, and  textiles).  The re- 
maining quotas were somewhat eased in  1990 and  1991. Further, domestic 
demand rose quite significantly in West Germany (by 5 percent in 1990, com- 
pared to a post-1973 average of  1.9 percent), a key export market for all three 
countries. 
There were  also important  domestic  reasons.  Enterprise  managers  were 
aware of the need to reorient their sales from Eastern to Western markets in 
view of the coming collapse of the CMEA. Moreover, following price liberal- 
ization, enterprises came under pressure to unload their inventories, which had 
been at very high levels owing to special features of the previous policy re- 
gime. The pressure was magnified by  a collapse in domestic demand, a by- 
product of the stabilization measures put in place in all three countries. Finally, 
the trade reforms discussed earlier must have increased the profitability of ex- 
ports to the West: import liberalization made available cheaper and higher- 
quality inputs, and devaluations served to increase the profitability  of export 
sales. 
Of these, only the collapse in domestic demand and the changes in trade 
policy (devaluation, in particular) qualify as serious contenders. The favorable 
external environment could have played at best a minor role. In view of  the 
small volume of exports from East European countries, it is difficult to believe 
that these countries faced a serious external demand constraint.  Hungary, Po- 
land, and Czechoslovakia taken together accounted for just about l percent of 
EC imports in 1988 and 2 percent of German imports. With respect to quantita- 
tive restrictions, there can be little doubt that these restrictions were pervasive, 
especially in textiles and clothing and in steel. But, once again, their impor- 
tance is limited since quotas were rarely binding. Some figures for Poland bear 
this out: only 68.7 percent of the EC quota in steel products was utilized in 
1989, and similar ratios held for previous years also; in textiles, in only three 
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1989 (Synowiec and Rzeszutek 1991). The situation was similar for Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia as well. 
On the  supply side, the incentive to reorient sales from East to West was 
clearly in place in  1990. But, as I have already discussed at greater length 
above, the reorientation that has taken place so far appears to have been limited 
at best. As regards the unloading of inventories, the decline in inventories gen- 
erally preceded the export response. In Poland, the sharpest reduction in inven- 
tories took place in January, when exports to the West actually fell.'o 
These considerations leave exchange rate policy and the domestic demand 
shock as the most important determinants of export performance. Both Poland 
and Czechoslovakia started their big bangs with substantial depreciations in 
the real  exchange rate. And the collapse in domestic demand has exceeded 
10 percent in both cases. In Hungary, meanwhile, the real exchange rate has 
appreciated  somewhat during  1990 (table  18.3 above), and the reduction in 
demand has not been as marked as in the other two cases. 
It is unlikely that either exchange  rate policy or the demand shock alone 
could have been responsible for the export boom to the West. First, the effec- 
tive real depreciations at the beginning of 1990 in Poland and at the beginning 
of  1991 in Czechoslovakia were smaller than the figures in table 18.3 suggest, 
owing to the presence of foreign-currency retention accounts in both countries 
prior to their big bangs. Enterprises were allowed to retain a share (40 percent 
in  Poland  and  30-35  percent  on average in  Czechoslovakia) of  their hard- 
currency earnings from exports. Hence, exporters were partially able to obtain 
the  more depreciated parallel rate even before the official  devaluations.  An 
appropriately calculated real exchange rate for exports would show a much 
smallerjump in both countries (for the Polish case, see Pinto [1991]). Second, 
the real rate has tended to appreciate after to the big bang. The appreciation 
was especially marked in Poland, where the fixed rate was eroded by a smaller- 
than-before, but nonetheless significant, inflation rate (table 18.3). By the third 
quarter of  1990, domestic prices had fully caught up with the exchange rate, 
as had domestic wages by the fourth quarter. These considerations undermine 
the importance of exchange rate policy and suggest that domestic demand may 
have played the key role. However, the Polish export boom has fizzled out in 
199  1, despite the continuation of the domestic slump. This outcome would be 
consistent with the sustained real appreciation of the zloty, suggesting that that 
boom had at least something to do with the devaluation on 1 January 1990. 
In principle, we can discriminate between the two competing hypotheses as 
they have somewhat different empirical implications. If the increase in exports 
is due primarily to devaluation  (or to the reduction in costs that arises from 
import liberalization), profitability across firms would be positively correlated 
with export orientation. If, on the other hand,  the increase in exports is due 
primarily to the reduction in home demand, profitability would be negatively 
10. For data on real inventories, see Calvo and Coricelli (1991, fig. 3). 342  Dani Rodrik 
correlated with export orientation. This is demonstrated in appendix C in the 
context of a simple model of firm behavior, with the firm assumed to be a price 
taker in world markets but a price maker domestically. When the increase in 
exports is a defensive move to compensate for the reduction in domestic sales, 
firms that increase their export shares the most will be the ones that suffer the 
greatest reductions  in  profitability in  equilibrium.  But,  when  the  increase 
comes about because of  an increase in export prices (or a reduction in input 
costs), higher export shares will go with higher profitability. 
Table  18.18 shows profitability rates  and  export shares  (in  convertible- 
currency trade) for twelve Polish industrial sectors. Note that profits have de- 
clined in all sectors (except for food processing) while the export share has 
increased across the board. Table 18.19 shows the situation in Hungary for the 
enterprise sector as a whole. While overall profitability appears to have  in- 
creased slightly in 1990, this can be attributed to a shift in the composition of 
exports from the East (where exports were less profitable) to the West (where 
they  were more profitable). The profitability of  exports to the convertible- 
currency area has actually fallen in 1990, while the export share has increased. 
The broad evidence, therefore, is more favorable to the demand-shock hy- 
pothesis. 
We  obtain the same conclusion from analyzing the variation across indus- 
tries in the Polish case (shown in table 18.18). The correlation coefficient be- 
tween the change in profitability and the change in export share is -  .43 for the 
Table 18.18  Export Orientation and Profitability in Polish Industry 
Exports to Convertible-Currency 
Area as a Share of Sales'  Cash-Flow Profitabilityb 
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Sources: Mueller (1991, table 4) and Schaffer (in press, table 6). 
"From a sample of  167 large enterprises. 
bCash-flow  profit is defined as historical cost profit -  nominal inventory accumulation + imputed depre- 
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Table 18.19  Export Orientation and Profitability in Hungary (all enterprises and 
cooperatives) 
I989  I990 




Net revenue from all sales as a share of direct costsh 
88.2  89.4 
4.2  2.5 
7.6  8.  I 
18.4  18.7 
Net revenue from ruble exports as a share of direct costs for ruble 
Net revenue from nonruble exports as a share of direct costs for ruble 
exports  19.2  16.2 
exports  31.4  26. I 
Source: OECD (1991b). 
Sales  revenue plus subsidies minus direct costs. 
“Labor  costs plus costs of material inputs plus marketing costs 
twelve industries included. That is, the industries that improved their export 
performance the most also suffered the greatest collapse in profits. 
Hence, this evidence suggests that the demand shock may  have been the 
predominant source of the export boom, with exchange rate policy playing a 
more secondary role. However, the evidence is weak and far from conclusive. 
18.6  Has Import Liberalization Fostered Price Discipline 
and Restructuring? 
The Polish and Czechoslovak big bangs encompassed trade liberalization 
alongside price decontrol in large part because the discipline of foreign compe- 
tition was seen to be a crucial restraint on domestic enterprises. Since the in- 
dustrial sectors of these economies are highly monopolized, one fear was that 
enterprise managers would use their new freedom to charge monopoly prices. 
Free trade would preclude such practices and obviate the need for a lengthy 
process  of  industrial  restructuring  before  price  liberalization  could  be 
launched. 
In Poland, there is no evidence that this has worked. As table 18.20 shows, 
the inflation  rate  came down substantially after  the price  adjustments had 
worked themselves through in the first two months of  1990. However, inflation 
exhibited a considerable persistence at the rate of 3-5  percent a month for the 
rest of the year. Given the constant exchange rate, this implied a substantial 
loss in competitiveness through the end of the year and the first half of the next 
(see the real exchange rate index in table 18.3 above). Moreover, inflation was 
not confined to services and nontradables, as the index for industrial goods’ 
prices in table 18.20 shows. Wages in fact rose slower than tradables prices, 
suggesting also that this was not a case of wage-push inflation (as in the similar 344  Dani Rodrik 
CPI  Industrial Price Index  CPI  Industrial Price Index 
1990: 
Jan.  79.6 
Feh.  23.8 
Mar.  4.3 
Apr.  7.5 
May  4.6 
Jun.  3.4 
Jul.  3.6 
Aug.  1.8 
Sep.  4.6 
Oct.  5.7 
Nov.  4.9 
Dec.  5.9 
109.6 
9.6 
~  .2 










Jan.  12.7 
Feb.  6.7 
Mar.  4.5 
Apr.  2.1 
May  2.7 
Jun.  4.9 
Jul.  .I 
Aug.  .6 











2.  I 
~_____ 
Source: GUS (1991~). 
Chilean  experience with  exchange  rate-based  disinflation  during  the  late 
1970s). 
The question is, How can the prices of domestic tradables continue to rise 
in the presence of a fixed exchange rate, low tariffs, and no quantitative restric- 
tions on imports? The only possible answer is that the unification of the ex- 
change rate with the jump devaluation of 1 January 1990 took place at too high 
a level, that is, that the zloty was undervalued throughout much of  1990. The 
devaluation left domestic prices too low in dollar terms and left headroom for 
upward adjustment. Hence, it must have been the undervaluation of the zloty 
that put upward pressure on domestic prices. 
In principle, it is not clear why the adjustment in prices could not have taken 
place in one jump. But in practice  it is not difficult to see how enterprises 
would be adjusting in a slower fashion and groping around for the prices that 
the market would bear. Of course, once the undervaluation was eliminated, as 
it must have been sometime toward the end of the year at the latest, the pressure 
for inflation on this account should have subsided. The reasons for the persis- 
tence of inflation from this point on must be sought in other factors, such as 
the relaxation  in fiscal and credit policies  and the increase in wages in the 
second half of the year (see Calvo and Coricelli  199  1). 
That the zloty was undervalued throughout most of 1990 is evinced also by 
the huge, unanticipated  surplus in Poland’s trade balance and by the fact that 
the fixed exchange rate could be maintained until May  1991, even though the 
initial judgment had been that it would last for a few months only. Interestingly, 
not only did the Polish authorities not come under pressure to provide domestic 
firms with trade protection-after  a radical trade reform and during a severe 
industrial recession-but  they were in fact pressed to do quite the opposite. 
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customs duties were suspended. Many of the imports involved were inputs for 
which no domestic competition existed, but the suspensions were also aimed 
at imposing price discipline through  imports. The suspensions covered more 
than half of all tariff lines and served to reduce the effective tariff rate by half 
(from 10.9 percent in the first half of  1990 to 5.2 percent in the last quarter 
[Bak et al. 19911). 
Berg and Sachs (1991) report the results of a cross-sectional regression of 
changes in Polish industrial sales (by sector) on a number of variables, includ- 
ing changes in import penetration. For  1990, they find that imports did not 
have any (economically or statistically) significant effect on industrial sales. 
This is consistent with the argument that the zloty was undervalued and import 
competition was not a serious disciplining factor during most of  1990. 
In 1991, with the continued appreciation of the zloty in real terms, the situa- 
tion changed quite a bit. Since the first quarter of  1991, an import boom has 
been in place, especially in consumer goods (table 18.21). Enterprise profits 
have plummeted in light industries, which bear the brunt of import pressure. 
Consequently, pressures for protection have intensified,  and the government 
has eliminated the suspensions and put  in place a new  tariff  schedule with 
higher average tariffs (see app. A). However, it is clear from the persistence of 
inflation that free trade is still not stabilizing domestic prices. 
Czechoslovakia’s  inflation  experience  has  been  different  from  Poland’s. 
Table 18.22 shows the remarkable stabilization in Czechoslovak prices by the 
middle of  1991. The liberalization of prices has led to a textbook case of a 
one-time jump in the price level. Since July, prices have been completely stable 
(further adjustments in controlled prices  in November have led to some in- 
creases not shown in the table, however). During the second half of  the year, 
prices of many consumer durables (such as radios, televisions, and passenger 
cars) were in fact declining. Profits in manufacturing industry have deterio- 
rated significantly throughout  199  1, especially in consumer goods, although 
Table 18.21  Composition and Trends in Imports (corresponding period previous 
year = 100) 
Raw Materials 
Total  Capital Goods  and Intermediary Goods  Consumer Goods 
Poland: 
1990:2  75.9  86.3 
1  990:  3  75.8  87.7 
1990:4  82.1  89.0 
199l:l  128.7  98.9 
1991:2  143.5  153.1 
1991:3  141.3  139.7 
1991:l-3  133.2  125.2 
Hungary: 
70.0 
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Table 18.22  Inflation in the CSFR: Change in Prices from Previous Month (9%) 
Of Which: 
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Source: Statisticke Prehledy (1991). 
much of this is no doubt due to the loss of export markets in the former So- 
viet Union. 
As discussed above, the devaluation of the koruna was cautious compared 
to the Polish case and did not aim to eliminate the black market premium at 
one go. The latter was achieved instead by a progressive reduction in the paral- 
lel rate as the domestic credit contraction took effect. In this sense, the Czecho- 
slovak  program  was  perhaps more  conducive  to importing  price  discipline 
from abroad. Nonetheless, the devaluation in December  1990 was still a large 
one (table 18.1 above), which left considerable room for an upward adjustment 
in domestic  prices  when  price  liberalization  went  into effect  the following 
month. As in Poland, the pressures on tariffs were in the downward direction, 
not upward: the phasing down of the 20 percent surcharge introduced on con- 
sumer goods alongside the big bang took place more rapidly than anticipated. 
There is of course another key difference from Poland. Inflation was never 
a serious problem in Czechoslovakia. Therefore, the stabilization program of 
1991 did not have to concern itself with rooting out endemic inflation; it could 
be limited to minimizing  the effects of  a one-time price adjustment  arising 
from decontrol. The inertial and expectational elements present in Poland were 
probably absent in Czechoslovakia. Hence, while the stabilization of prices in 
Czechoslovakia is consistent with the more gradual unification of the exchange 
rate, one cannot read too much into it. 
18.7  Concluding Remarks 
Briefly put, the tentative conclusions of this paper are as follows. First, the 
changes in trade policy have been quite dramatic, and all three countries have 
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and speed. Second, judging by partner statistics, export performance has been 
impressive in all three countries, and import booms are under way  in at least 
Hungary and Poland as well. Third, despite what the aggregate statistics show, 
there is no evidence that exporters have had any success in finding Western 
markets for the exports that they have lost in Eastern markets. The export boom 
is based on different kinds of products than those traditionally sold in the East. 
Fourth, the Soviet trade shock is very serious indeed, with real income losses 
(on impact) amounting to 7-8  percent of GDP in Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
and 3V2 percent of GDP in Poland. Fifth, export performance can be attributed 
to exchange rate policy in part, but the collapse of domestic demand has possi- 
bly played an even more important role. Sixth, trade liberalization so far ap- 
pears to have had little effect on price discipline among domestic enterprises 
or on industrial restructuring, thanks in large part to the substantial  devalua- 
tions that have accompanied it. 
Appendix A 
A Summary of Reforms in Trade and Exchange 
Rate Policy" 
Hungary 
Foreign exchange system. The forint is not convertible to foreign currencies, 
but in principle foreign exchange is made available to importers automatically 
if the product is not subject to licensing. As a general rule, other transactions 
are subject to a foreign exchange license. The exchange rate is set on the basis 
of a basket of currencies, with the value of the forint adjusted against the basket 
at irregular intervals. 
Tariffs. Tariffs averaged around 13 percent in 1991. Other charges apply in 
addition to tariffs: a 2 percent customs clearance fee, a 3 percent statistical fee, 
and 1 percent licensing fee if the imported item is subject to licensing. 
Licensing and import quotas. Until January  1989, all imports and exports 
were subject to licensing. Continued liberalization since then has reduced the 
scope of  licensing to imports covering less than  10 percent of total import 
value. There exists a consumer goods quota that covers fifteen product groups. 
The size of  the consumer goods quota was tripled in  1991 to ($650 million 
from $200 million in  1990).  There is also an advance import-deposit require- 
ment for 100 percent of the value of the intended import. 
Export measures. Restrictions apply on exports of  steel (to the EC and the 
United States), sheep and sheep meat (to the EC), and textiles and clothing (to 
1 I. Information reported in app. A has been obtained from World Bank (1991), GATT (1991), 
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the EC, the United States, Canada, and Norway). Hungary maintains export 
subsidies on a number of agricultural products (including milk and dairy prod- 
ucts, fruit and vegetables, and sheep meat). 
Poland 
Foreign exchange system. Since 1 January  1990, the zloty is convertible to 
foreign currencies for current account transactions. The exchange rate was held 
fixed against the U.S. dollar at Z19,500 from this date until 17 May  1991, after 
which the zloty was pegged to a basket following a discrete devaluation. On 
14 October 1991, the zloty was put on a preannounced downward crawl (at the 
rate of about 1.8 percent a month). Another discrete devaluation took place in 
February  1992. 
Tariffs. The average (trade-weighted) tariff rates were 8.9 percent in  1989 
and 8.6 percent in  1990. During  1990 and the first half of  1991, tariffs were 
suspended  on  a  wide  range  of  goods  (mainly  raw  materials,  intermediate 
goods, and engineering products), pulling the average rate down. On  1 August 
1991, a new tariff schedule was introduced, with eight basic rates from 0 to 40 
percent, and suspensions were considerably limited. These changes have raised 
the average tariff rate to 13.6 percent. 
Licensing and import quotas. Import quotas do not exist (save for certain 
alcoholic beverages), and licensing is limited to a few items. 
Export measures. There are no export subsidies. Export restrictions apply 
on some “essential”  goods for the domestic market and on goods subject to 
“voluntary”  export  restraints  (textiles  and  clothing,  steel,  and  sheep-  and 
mutton-meat exports to the EC; textiles exports to the United States, Canada, 
Sweden, and Norway). 
Czechoslovakia 
Foreign exchange system. As of  15 January 1991, the koruna is convertible 
to foreign currencies for current account transactions. (There is a limit of KEs 
5,000 per person for travel abroad, however.) The value of the koruna is deter- 
mined according to a basket of currencies. 
Tariffs. Tariffs average around 5 percent, and 96 percent of tariff lines are 
bound under GATT. On 28 December  1990, a temporary 20 percent import 
surcharge was introduced mostly on foodstuffs and consumer goods. The sur- 
charge was reduced to 18 percent and subsequently to 15 percent during the 
course of  199  1. 
Licensing and  import quotas.  Quantitative controls  on  imports are abol- 
ished, and only a few import licenses remain (on items such as drugs, weapons, 
and the like). 
Export measures. There  are no taxes or subsidies on exports. Almost 20 
percent of exports remain subject to licensing. These cover weapons, “essen- 
tial” inputs for domestic users (e.g., coal, cereals, and milk), and “voluntary” 
export restraints. The latter apply on metallurgical products (the EC), mutton 349  Foreign Trade in Eastern Europe's Transition: Early Results 
(the EC), and textiles and clothing (the EC, the United States, Canada, and 
Norway). 
Appendix B 
The Anatomy of  the Soviet Trade Shock 
Understanding the Soviet trade shock requires understanding the mechanics of 
the pricing of imports and exports under the CMEA. 
The domestic price of, say, crude oil, imported from the Soviet Union was 
determined in the following manner. First, a five-year moving average of world 
market prices (in dollars) would be calculated. Then this average price would 
be converted to TRs by using the IBEC exchange rate (which has varied in the 
range TR 0.60-TR  0.75/$1.00). This price in TRs would then be the border 
price at which the oil was imported.  The domestic-currency  price would in 
turn be the TR price multiplied by the national exchange rate between the TR 
and the national currency. Hence, the domestic price (denoted PJ would be 
where P,*is the dollar moving-average price, ekls  is the IBEC rate (TR/$), and 
eR  is the national exchange rate between the domestic currency (NC) and the 
TR (NC/TR). This can be stated equivalently as 
(B2) 
where eR$  is the national cross-rate between the TR and the dollar (TR/$), and 
e, is the national exchange rate against the dollar (NU$). Note that eR$  is an 
implicit rate, obtained by dividing e, by eR.  As mentioned in the text, the ruble 
was implicitly valued more cheaply than the IBEC rate in all three countries, 
so (ek,le,$)  < 1. 
P, =  P,*  x (ek$leR$)  x e$ 
Export prices were determined in more or less the same manner: 
with the caveat that manufactured exports rarely had adequate comparators in 
world markets. So the border price set in TRs was more or less a negotiated 
price. Nonetheless, we can still use this (and the IBEC exchange rate) to define 
an implicit dollar price at the border, p,*. Note the important conclusion that 
the gap between eRs  and eks kept domestic prices of  imports and exports cheap 
(relative to trade with the convertible-currency area), acting as an import sub- 
sidy and an export tax in ruble trade. 
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as in any other trade.  So import and export prices in domestic currency  are 
now given by 
where the prime indicates that posttransition world prices in dollar terms may 
differ from those prevailing earlier. (But, to save on notation, and with no loss 
of generality, e, is assumed to remain unchanged.) 
Comparing (B2)-(B3)  with (B4)-(B5),  we see that the move to dollar pric- 
ing involves two distinct effects. One, the terms-of-trade  (TOT) effect, is the 
change from p:/p:  to p:'/p:'.  The second, the removal of the import subsidy 
(RS), is the unification of the cros+rate as ek,/e,,  effectively goes to unity. 
The third shock arises from the gap between export prices obtained in the 
Soviet market, p:, and those prevailing for comparable substitutes  in  world 
markets, p,,. Holding export prices constant, on every unit reduction of exports 
to the Soviet Union, a loss of p:  ~  p,, is incurred on this account. This is the 
market-loss (ML) effect. 
Appendix C 
Discriminating between the Exchange Rate and 
Demand-Shock Explanations  for the Export Boom 
Consider a firm that has market power at home but is a price taker in its export 
sales. Let home demand be given by q =  a -  p, where p stands for the domes- 
tic price. The demand intercept, a, will proxy for demand shocks. The world 
price in domestic currency is given by e, which also stands for the exchange 
rate. Costs are given by c(q + q*),  where q*  is exports. The firm's profits are 
T  =  pq + eq* -  c(q + q*)* = (a -  q)q + eq* -  c(q + q*)2, 
with the following two first-order conditions for domestic and export sales, re- 
spectively 
a -  2q -  2c(q + q*) = 0, 
e -  2c(q + q*) = 0. 
Solving these two equations, we get the equilibrium values of q and q* 
q = V2(a -  e),  q* = '/2(e[(l + c)/c] -  a}. 
For home sales and exports both to be positive, we require 
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We assume that this condition is satisfied. 
profit function: 
By  substituting  back  into  the objective  function,  we obtain  the  indirect 
a(a, e, c)  = (114)[(a  -  e)'  + (e*Ic)]. 
The share of exports in total sales (= a)  is in turn given by 
a(a,  e, c) = 1 -  [(a -  e)c]le. 
Note the various derivatives: 
ddda = '12 (a -  e) > 0, 
dalde = 'h[(e/c)  -  (a -  e)]  >  0, 
daldc = -(1/4)(eIc)* < 0, 
ddda = -(cle) <  0, 
dalde = acle'  >  0, 
daldc = -  (a -  e)/e < 0. 
Now we can see how profits and the export share covary with changes in the 
exogenous parameters: 
Devaluation: 
Reduction in input costs: 
Reduction in home 
demand: 
Hence, these shocks have different implications  for the correlation between 
export shares and profitability. When the predominant  shock is a fall in de- 
mand, we would expect firms that experience the highest reductions in profits 
also to experience the largest increases in export orientation. With the other 
two shocks, profits and export orientation are positively correlated. 
de > 0+ d.rr >  Oandda > 0. 
dc <  0 +  d.rr > 0 and da > 0. 
da < 0 +dm  < Oandda > 0. 
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Comment  Susan M. Collins 
This paper provides a useful and informative survey of a number of key aspects 
of recent trade performance in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. I agreed 
with many of the conclusions reached in the paper and found it quite interest- 
ing to read. However, there are a few areas where it seems to me that the paper 
misses some central points, leading the conclusions astray. I will discuss five 
of the main sections of the paper, pointing out my agreements and disagree- 
ments along the way. 
The paper begins with a review of  recent developments in trade policy in 
the three countries. Quite rightly, it emphasizes the dramatic shift toward liber- 
alization in each country, although there have been differences in the speeds of 
liberalization.  This  section  provides  a  very  helpful  summary  of  the  key 
changes. 
The paper then discusses recent trade performance. In particular, it shows 
the impressive increase in both exports and imports with the West. This discus- 
sion incorporates an appropriate skepticism of the available data, providing 
very  interesting comparisons  of  figures from the countries themselves with 
figures from partner countries. It is worth making the point that, in  1989 and 
1990, many analysts predicted that the East European economies would find it 
extremely difficult to increase exports to the West in the  short run because 
there were supposedly very few products that Western consumers would wish 
to purchase. This line of thought led to extremely pessimistic forecasts of their 
external balances during transition. The actual export figures tell a very differ- 
ent story. Exports grew within the first few months of the new policy regimes. 
Of course, these experiences raise two questions. First, what accounts for the 
rapid export increases? Second, can they be sustained? I will return to these 
issues below. 
One possible explanation for the very rapid surge in exports to the West is 
that enterprises simply reoriented exports that used to go to CMEA (Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance) countries to market economies. The paper 
does a very  nice job of  debunking that hypothesis.  It shows-not  surpris- 
ingly-that  the mix of  products exported to the West has historically  been 
quite different from the mix exported to the East. If trade  had  simply been 
reoriented, one would expect to see the discrepancies in the industrial compo- 
sition narrow. However, there is no evidence of this at the aggregate industrial 
sector  level.  (Of  course,  there  may  have  been  reorientation  of  specific 
products.) 
The paper then goes on to consider four explanations for the boom in exports 
to the West: favorable foreign demand, pressure to unload inventories, the col- 
lapse in domestic demand, and the increased relative profitability of  exports 
owing to the devaluations and other policy changes. The first two are dismissed 
rapidly. I agree that demand from the market economies had not been a con- 
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the dramatic surge. While the observed timing of inventory depletion and the 
export surges does not suggest that inventories are the key to the explanation, 
this connection  warranted additional discussion in the paper. The larger the 
role that inventories played, the worse the prognosis for the increased exports 
to be sustainable. 
Too much of the paper is then devoted to trying to distinguish between the 
demand collapse and the relative price explanations. First, it seems to me that 
this is a secondary issue, considerably less interesting and important than as- 
sessing whether the export surge can  be  sustained  and how well  exports  in 
these countries responded  to market  signals at all during the early phase of 
their transitions. Second, the methodology used cannot adequately distinguish 
between these and alternative explanations of performance. 1  elaborate on this 
point below. 
The approach is based on a simple model of profit-maximizing firm behav- 
ior in which all firms can choose between selling domestically as price setters 
or selling abroad as price takers. This model implies that a decline in domestic 
demand will give rise to a negative correlation between observed exports and 
firm profits since those firms experiencing the largest decline in domestic de- 
mand and thus in profits will increase exports most. However, a devaluation 
would give rise to a positive correlation between profitability and exports. Let 
me leave aside all the data issues and assume that we have accurate measures 
of profitability and exports (recall, however, that an earlier section of the paper 
emphasized that small private endeavors, which now account for an increasing 
amount of exports, are not adequately reflected in published statistics). 
There are at least three problems with applying this model to Eastern Europe 
in transition.  First, not  all products  are equally  salable in the West. As the 
regime changes to allow additional sales to market economies, we should ex- 
pect those firms producing goods most easily sold in the West to experience 
the smallest declines in profits and the largest rise in exports. This phenomenon 
could account for a positive correlation  even without  a decline in domestic 
demand. Sccond, the model implicitly assumes that firms have optimally allo- 
cated their sales between  exports and domestic consumers before the shock 
(demand collapse or devaluation). Clearly, this need not be true of pretransition 
enterprises. Given an arbitrary allocation, it is difficult to interpret the changes 
observed at the beginning of the transition. Finally, it may not be accurate to 
classify East European  exporters as price takers  in Western  markets for this 
purpose.  Even  though they  account for a very  small  share of  total  Western 
consumption, it would not be surprising to find that they had reduced prices on 
a number of products in order to sell them quickly for Western hard currencies. 
If  the East “dumped” products  in the West, one would  expect to  observe a 
negative correlation between profitability and export volume, even if there had 
been no devaluation. 
The last section of the paper argues that, contrary to some people’s expecta- 
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tion, citing the persistence of inflation despite fixed exchange rates, low tariffs, 
and the removal of quantitative restrictions on imports. Here, I think that the 
paper focuses too much on the issue of discipline and not enough on the issue 
of price-system restructuring. In light of the experience with the slow reduction 
of  inflation in the Southern Cone and other stabilization attempts, I do not find 
it at all surprising that Polish inflation persisted.  But there is a second, and 
perhaps more  interesting,  explanation  for the persistence  of  inflation.  The 
economies in Eastern Europe are attempting to rationalize the structure of their 
price systems by importing prices from the rest of the world. The discrepancies 
in relative prices in socialist economies compared with comparable relative 
prices in market economies are well known. Thus, in some cases, the required 
relative  price  adjustments  are enormous. It may well  be that it is easier  to 
achieve a massive price restructuring  primarily through  price increases than 
through nominal price decreases. If so, the restructuring would give rise to a 
general price inflation. It is interesting to note that Czechoslovakia, which had 
a price structure more in line with world prices than the Polish structure, has 
found inflation to be less persistent than Poland. The extent of price restructur- 
ing and the relation between restructuring and overall inflation are important 
topics that warrant additional analysis. 
Discussion Summary 
Kemal Derviq noted that state enterprises produce most of the goods that Po- 
land exports. GeofSrey Carliner wondered whether state-owned firms have suf- 
ficient motivation and skills to expand this activity by seeking out new markets 
in the West. 
Jeffrey Sachs made several comments. First, he noted that, at least in Poland, 
an “equalization  tax”  was used  in internal markets  to increase  the price  of 
Soviet imports. Moreover, the revenue from this tax was used to subsidize ex- 
ports.  Together, these programs undid the effect of the overvalued effective 
exchange rate of Poland vis-A-vis the Soviet Union. Second, Sachs said that it 
is not appropriate to compare a terms-of-trade loss, which is an income effect, 
to a reduction in real GNP, which is an output effect. Third, Sachs presented 
evidence supporting the thesis that the export boom was due largely to an ag- 
gressive policy  of  export  expansion  by  East  European industrial  firms.  He 
noted that World Bank economists have observed an explosion in the number 
of contacts between East European industrial firms and Western buyers/suppli- 
ers. Sachs also cited particular instances in which East European firms have 
produced new products exclusively for export to the West. Finally, he empha- 
sized that only a small part of the export boom can conceivably be explained 
by depleted inventory stocks. 
Richard Freeman suggested that Rodrik consider the economic performance 356  Dani Rodrik 
of Finland as a benchmark for comparison with the East European countries. 
Freeman also wondered whether the East European import boom was being 
driven by consumption goods. 
Mark Schaffer supported the consensus view that, at least in Poland, inven- 
tory depletion did not play an important role in the export boom. He said that, 
whatever the movements in inventories, the inventory stocks  just were not large 
enough to account for the massive increase in exports. 
Kalman Mizsei noted  that, in most of Eastern Europe, and particularly  in 
Poland and Hungary, pressure is mounting for the governments to reverse their 
programs of import liberalization. He said that many of the governments have 
already increased tariffs and quotas and temporarily suspended the liberaliza- 
tion process. 
Sweder van Wijnbergen suggested that Rodrik look at the correlation be- 
tween changes in sectoral markups and changes in sectoral import penetration. 
A strong negative coefficient would provide evidence that trade competition 
provides price discipline. 
Dani Rodrik disagreed  with  Sachs’s suggestion  that  the  equalization  tax 
completely offset the effects of overvalued exchange rates. Rodrik said that the 
equalization tax only partially mitigated the exchange rate distortions. To sup- 
port this point, he noted that the effective price that East European enterprises 
pay for oil rose as a result of price liberalization. Finally, Rodrik agreed with 
Sachs that terms-of-trade effects are not directly comparable to GDP effects. 
However, Rodrik suggested that it is not clear which measure is more informa- 
tive since both are problematic.  The GDP measure understates the effect on 
incomes of the terms-of-trade shock, and the terms-of-trade measure needs to 
be scaled by a Keynesian multiplier. 